INTERTEXTUALITY AS DISCOURSE STRATEGY: THE CASE OF NO-CONFIDENCE DEBATES IN THAILAND

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Abstract

The discourse of Thai parliamentary no-confidence debates is intended to be formal in nature, and is defined as such by the constitution and relevant parliamentary regulations. However, the reality of this 'parliamentary' discourse does not always meet this idea. There is evidence of mixed genres and the combination of the language user's (henceforth S) voice and other's throughout the discourse of the debate. The combination of genres and voices in the discourse represents two levels of intertextuality (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 49).

This paper argues that intertextuality is part of the in-built structure of the no-confidence debate discourse which operates in the face of three competing conjunctures: the debate's purpose, its multiple audiences and its code of behaviour. Intertextuality reflects the struggle of the members of the Thai parliament to balance three purposes: the desire of highly partisan debaters to cause maximum damage to the opposing side, their need to seek public support and the need to stay within the parliamentary codes of behaviour. In this light, intertextuality can be seen as a strategy enabling MPs to produce a kind of discourse that can serve these competing social and political purposes, and to do so within the constraints of its three conjunctures.

1. Introduction

This paper tries to analyse the role of intertextuality in Thai no-confidence debate discourse. It adopts Chouliaraki and Fairclough's 2-level definition of intertextuality; the combination of genre and the combination of voices within the discourse. It argues that this can be used as a strategy to produce the most effective discourse within that particular context. This hypothesis is based on the concept of *genre* as 'a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular social practice' (Fairclough, 1995: 14) such as interview genre, narrative genre, parliamentary genre and the concept of *voice* as an indication of who the participants of the discourse are and what identity they assume. This paper adopts discourse analysis's assumption that language has dialectical relationship with the society. Therefore, since genre and voice are the textual representation of the interface between discourse and society, the changing articulation of genre and the use of more than one voice may have the potential to redefine the context within which the discourse takes place. In this light it can also be seen as a discourse strategy.

We begin section 2 with some background on Thai no-confidence debates to enable the reader to appreciate the role of these debaters within Thai society. Also we move on to the linguistic literature in an attempt to define the term intertextuality. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis and the scope of our study. Section 4 to Section 6 are the intertextual analysis. We adopt Chouliaraki and Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 60) to analyse no-confidence debates discourse. This framework is used in order to detect intertextuality in the discourse and how it works. The analytical framework starts with the analysis of conjunctures in Section 4, the analysis of the relevant social practices

in Section 5 and the analysis of the discourse in Section 6. The overall outcome of the CDA analysis is discussed in Section 7.

2. Background

No-confidence debates are among the most exciting political events in Thailand. The debate is always at the centre of public attention. The period leading up to the debate, the debate session and the follow-up after the debate appear to mesmerise the nation. Unlike other discourses in the same *field of discourse* (parliament) (Bernstein 1990, 1996), no-confidence debates are the form of parliamentary discourse which attracts the widest audience by far and engages most media and public attention.

No-confidence debate discourse stands out from other parliamentary discourse in terms of its style, and the level of public and media attention it receives. The discourse of no-confidence debate departs from the 'appropriate' (Fairclough 1995: 245) form of parliamentary discourse regulated by the parliamentary code of behaviour.[1] Instead of conforming to moderation, most of the debates feature outrageous styles of discourse. Not only does the discourse not adhere to the parliamentary code of behaviour, it is also internally inconsistent. It shows *intertextuality*, *linguistic heterogeneity* and *hybridisation* (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999) of public written discourse and private conversational discourse.

According to philosophers and critical linguists such as, M.M. Bakhtin, Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes, discourse does not have a self-contained meaning (Fairclough 1995; Allen 2000). It takes on meaning in its own context. The meaning of discourse has historical as well as sociocultural qualities built into it. Language acquires its meaning in relation to outside forces and factors: context, previous texts and culture (Allen 2000: 44). The inter-relational quality of discourse prevents it from being interpreted literally. Some linguists and language philosophers term this dependency relationship between meaning of discourse and its history and context 'intertextuality'. In this case, intertextual analysis is an attempt to find the traces society has in discourse and how discourse is designed to interact with society.

However, intertextuality is a critical term which is variously defined (Allen 2000: 2). Definitions vary according to what aspect of discourse theorists find related to the society, for example, intertextuality is most commonly understood to mean the dependency of discourse's meaning on a text which was produced earlier. However, this paper adopts Fairclough's definition of intertextuality (Fairclough 1995, 2000a, 2000b; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999).

Fairclough defines intertextuality as the changing articulation of *genres*. For Fairclough, society not only manifests itself in the meaning of discourse, but also through the form of discourse such as its genre. Genre is a kind of text configured by text type which has been developed and conventionalised (Fairclough 1995). Genre is the production of social practice, as well as of the society within which the social interaction takes place (Fairclough 2000a). He believes that text does not directly initiate genre; text can manifest complex mixed genres. The recurring pattern of complex mixed genres occurs in the same *order of discourse* (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 59). These ordered sets of discursive practices are associated with particular social domains of institutions. The particular domain within which

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[1] The code of behaviour for parliamentary debate consists of the rules stated in the Constitutions and the rules of the parliamentary regulations.

discourse takes place is termed its *field of discourse* (Bernstein 1990, 1996). This existence of different genres in the same discourse is called intertextuality. Intertextual analysis aims to describe the intertextual configuration of text: uncovering how several text types may be drawn upon and combined simultaneously and what social purposes that formulae of mixed genre may serve.

Parliamentary discourse is a field of discourse where there is evidence of intertextuality. It is one of the fields where the demarcation of the order of discourse becomes blurred. No-confidence discourse is not always tightly controlled in terms of political relevance. This loose topical control is typical of informal conversation. It features varieties associating with quite different sorts of context and purpose. The boundaries between varieties in the sociolinguistic order are complex; they merge and overlap.

Intertextuality can be understood on two levels:

1. 'It is the combination in discourse of different genres or different discourses' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 49).
2. It is the presence in my discourse of the specific words of the other mixed with my words as for instance reported speech' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 49).

The no-confidence debate discourse shows evidences of intertextuality at both levels. It draws upon reported speech and employs a variety of genres demonstrated by the use of different discourse-type choices. The choices indicate different genres, for example a choice indicating a conversational genre appears in the form of reported speech. Therefore it is justified to say that a Thai no-confidence debate has *mixed intertextuality* which means that even a single clause may be *multi-generic* (Fairclough 1995:15). Multi-generic clause means a clause which demonstrates more than one genre.

The proliferation of intertextuality in the no-confidence debate discourse could be seen as a product of the configurations of the discourse in this parliamentary field, most especially in the no-confidence debates. It shows the effort of S to produce discourse in relation to the *conjunctures* in a given context. By conjuncture, Chouliaraki and Fairclough mean 'a specification of the configuration of practices which the discourse in focus is located within' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 61). The form of the no-confidence debate discourse is the product of its context: its rationale, its purpose and the regulations it has to abide by. Intertextuality can be considered a linguistic strategy used by S in the context of the no-confidence debate to successfully communicate within the constraints of that particular context.

This paper is an attempt to analyse two aspects of no-confidence debate:

1. The conjunctures surrounding no-confidence debates.
2. Evidence of intertextuality in no-confidence debate discourse.

The conjunctures surrounding no-confidence debates will be analysed in order to find out whether the proliferation of intertextuality is evidence that discourse does interact dialectically with its society; and whether it is possible to categorise intertextuality as one of the linguistic strategies.

3. Data and Scope of the Study

This paper analyses the speeches of three opposition MPs during two no-confidence debates, those of May 1995 and September 1996. Chalerm Yubumrung, Muanchon Party (MP) leader, and Samak Sundaravej, Prachakorn Thai Party (PTP) leader, spoke in a no-confidence debate which took place in May 1995. This is when the government led by Democrat Party leader, Chuan Leekpai was under public scrutiny over the case of the land reform programme, *so po ko 4-01*. Trairong Suwanakiri, Democrat Party MP made his speech in 1996. The purpose of the September1996 debate was to pass a vote of no-confidence against prime minister Banharn Silpa-archa for his inefficiency in office. The three MPs are chosen because they demonstrate different approaches in formulating the no-confidence speeches. In other words, they have their own rhetorical styles. Chalerm, Samak and Trairong can be considered established political figures who have their own special places and roles in Thai politics.

These two debates in 1995 and 1996 were selected as my data because they led to the downfall of the governments concerned. Chuan who led the 1995 government announced the dissolution of parliament before the vote could be taken. In 1996, even though the vote went in favour of the prime minister, Banharn had already promised to step down within seven days.

Speeches will be analysed intertextually. First, the study will look at the context in which the no-confidence debate is situated: *conjunctures[2] of the debate* and the political context at the time of the two debates. After the analysis of conjunctures, it will move on to analyse the discourse of the debate starting with a structural analysis. We will analyse the order of discourse to see which genres, discourses and voices from which order of discourse are articulated together. Then the analysis moves on to see how the genres and discourses drawn upon are worked together in order to interact with its context.

3.   Analysis of conjunctures

In order to analyse the conjunctures surrounding the no-confidence debate, we have to put the debate back into its context and analyse it within that particular context. No-confidence debates have their own unique rationale which is different from other types of parliamentary debates. The rationale and mechanism for no-confidence debates provide three major conjunctures of its discourse**:**

- Conjuncture 1: Purpose of the Debate

The no-confidence debate is one mechanism for checking a government's power. The opposition is given this channel to debate with the government concerning issues they believe the government has administered inappropriately. It is also an opportunity to reveal a government's wrong-doings, such as corruption, to the public. The mechanism of checks and balances has the purpose of preventing the well-being of the majority from falling into the potentially corrupt hands of an unrepresentative elite.

Unfortunately, this idealistic purpose has been somewhat distorted. The rationality behind the debate has been overlooked and a Thai no-confidence debate is

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[2] Chouliaraki and Fairclough defines conjuncture as 'a particular path through the network of social practices which constitutes the social structures' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 61). This paper employed a rather simplified version of the term. We use it to mean the condition for the production and consumption of discourse which is posed by the combination of contextual factors.

generally nothing more than a weapon the opposition has to wound and ideally bring down the government. The purpose of the attack is predominantly for the opposition parties to create for themselves a chance to become part of the government or to usurp the government. 'Benefit of the majority' is used simply as a rhetorical basis for this pragmatic end.

'Benefit to themselves, their clique and their party' is more precisely the ultimate goal of the opposing sides. To be a part of the government means being in control of the public's resources and the party responsible for a given ministry can reap benefits from those resources. The chance to be part of a government can come in one of the three following options:

    a. cabinet reshuffle
    b. reshuffle of coalition parties
    c. dissolution of the parliament

Since maximising benefits is a priority, opposition parties prefer the option that guarantees the fastest and most benefits. The first option is generally considered more preferable because the gaining of position is instantaneous: the opposition party simply replaces the withdrawn coalition party, and typically takes over the ministries for which that former coalition party was responsible. For the latter options politicians have to go through money-intensive electioneering processes (Surin and McCargo 1997: 137) while having to run the risk of eventually losing their seats or not joining the coalition if elected. However, the latter option can be preferable in certain circumstances: firstly, if a government has only a short time left until the end of their four-year term; secondly, if the coalition party they are about to replace is responsible for a low profile ministry that yields less benefit such as the Ministry of Labour and Public Welfare without having control over any sought-after ministry such as the Interior.

It is worth noting that a government is rarely brought down by the prime minister's resignation and/or dissolution of the parliament. Generally speaking, it takes much more effort to force Thai prime minister to show his responsibility by dissolving the parliament and/or resigning than to force the prime minister of a western country to do so. Thai prime ministers can survive more serious allegations that tarnish their own or their coalition parties' reputations. There is a strong tendency for a Thai prime minister to choose to remain in office even though their integrity has been compromised in the eyes of the public. In other words, there are relatively few situations serious enough for them to feel obliged to show their responsibility and integrity.

Even though the rationale behind a no-confidence debate is predominantly to get the opposition their share of economic benefits- which lie in the control of state resources- some researchers argue that there is more logic behind the debates. Paul Handley optimistically saw these debates as a very important check of the abuse of power underpinned by a free press (Handley 1996). Handley argued that it was this role of scrutiny that the notoriously corrupt police and justice system could no longer handle. He considered no-confidence debates to be an attempt to apply the rule of law to the rulers. In a country such as Thailand, where many officials are prone to trade justice for money, it is not surprising that rulers or anybody with money or power can be above the law.

- Conjuncture 2: The Debate's multiple audiences

A no-confidence debate is the only type of parliamentary discourse that is broadcast in its entirely. It has emerged as a form of parliamentary debate that enjoys overwhelming media and public attention in Thailand. The first debate was broadcast in 1989 during the government led by Major General Chatichai Chunhawan. Chatichai was considered the first elected prime minister of Thailand since the short-lived governments of M.R. Kukrit and M.R. Seni Pramoj (Weatherbee 1990: 337). The broadcasting of the debate can be optimistically seen as an attempt to 'open up and democratize political process under an elected government' (Weatherbee 1990: 343). Since then it has been a tradition that the debate, which later became a twice annual event, was broadcast.

The 1989 broadcast was the first time that the public gained access to actual parliamentary discourse. The debate has thus become a public space where people can see their MPs at work in the parliament. Public involvement has had a major impact on the discourse. Broadcast debate has brought in the public as a third party into the formerly two-sided parliamentary discourse. Before this point, there were only MPs and a handful of media people witnessing the process. The discourse was then mainly designed for the audience of politicians in the parliament. However, as soon as the debate was made public, S has to take into account the audience *outside* the parliament.

Since the debate is broadcast nationwide, the audience includes various groups of people with different background knowledge. It is important for S to attend to the interest and preference of the widest audience possible because the audience also holds the mandate. In a representative democracy where every vote counts, MPs need all the public support they can get. Moreover, the no-confidence debates are one of the few occasions where people get to see their MP's performance. They then need to make the most of this opportunity in showing that they are capable of performing their parliamentary duties. On top of that, the media debate gives the opportunity to electioneer should the prime minister choose to dissolve the parliament after the debate. Since the run up to the election period can be relatively short in Thailand, the earlier the campaign starts the better. The no-confidence debate is likely to be the only chance for MPs to give televised speeches without having to pay for airtime. Therefore, they have to make the most of this chance by designing their speech to serve these purposes as well as the 'official' purpose of the debate.

To cater for such a wide audience for these various purposes, S first has to manage to maintain the attention of his/her audience throughout his/her speech. This is because, no matter how good his/her argument is, if the audience does not listen, the speech will not produce any substantial impact. Since the audience does not comprise professional politicians, they may not know about or be interested in many of the technical details about administration. The debate therefore should be delivered in an entertaining and interesting manner to maintain public attention. Generally speaking, what the audience expects to see most from no-confidence debate is some witty arguments, verbal performances and verbal confrontations. The substance of an allegation can be of secondary interest compared to the way allegations are put forward. The audience expects to see some war of wit displayed in verbal interactions.

Not only does the public become another party in the debate, it is potentially the most influential party involved. As discussed in conjuncture 1, it is unlikely that the coalition will collapse due to the passing of a no-confidence vote. Since the coalition holds the majority of seats in the parliament, the odds are that the vote will

not be passed. Being aware that the opposition is the minority and is normally bound to lose the vote, the opposition parties feel the necessity to conduct the most effective and convincing debate that they can, not so much for the purpose of passing the vote but because the debate is their only chance to attack the government. The debate is therefore more or less a 'character assassination'. The opposition tries to argue that the coalition is either corrupt, inept or inefficient while they themselves are more fit to be in office. By doing so, the public has been put in the position of a jury judging who is more suitable to be their representative. Given this mechanism, public opinion can be the only real weapon the opposition has to pressure the government.

- Conjuncture 3: Parliamentary Code of Behaviour

A no-confidence debate is governed by the rules of the ordinary proceedings. However, there are certain rules especially for such debates laid down in the Constitution. Some of the rules for the no-confidence debate are stated in the House of Representative's rule of procedure.

The debate has to conform to the topic proposed. It must avoid verbal extravagance, repetition or overlapping with the speech of other members. The unnecessary exposition or reading of any material is prohibited. Any evidence to be shown in the House has to be approved by the House President. Verbal and non-verbal action to accuse or sarcastically abuse others is also prohibited. In addition, it is strictly prohibited to mention the Monarchy or other people unnecessarily (House of Representatives rules of procedure No. 56)

Apart from the rules stated in the Constitution, the no-confidence debate is also framed by the code of behaviour laid down for the purpose of keeping parliamentary debate as refined and formal as possible. The code is stated in parliamentary regulations. It helps minimise the chance of emotional confrontation between members by prohibiting potential Face Threatening Acts (henceforth FTAs) (Brown and Levinson, 1987) so that order can be maintained in the House.

According to the code of behaviour, there are many sections designed to prevent provocative arguments occurring, for example, the rule that prohibits verbal and non-verbal accusation: these can be considered extreme FTAs. In order to solicit as much information as possible, the code gives members of the House privilege to express words, give statements or vote freely without being charged. However, this parliamentary privilege only covers debates which are not made public by broadcasting. Parliamentary privilege does not extend to no-confidence debates, because they are broadcast. On top of this, the code gives the Speaker of the House absolute power to conduct the debate according to the code of behaviour and they have the unarguable right to expel from the premises any member who violates the rules. However, despite the frequent breaches of the code of behaviour, it is very rare indeed for an MP to be expelled.

By setting up a strict code of behaviour and giving full power to the 'code keeper'- the Speaker of the House- theoretically the rules should be strictly adhered to. There should not be any expletives or provocative accusations or threats expressed in the House. The debate should proceed in the most orderly and formal way possible according to the purpose of the code. However, in reality this is not always the case. In practice, there are words that are not only unparliamentary but also unacceptable in educated, respectable society that are uttered during the debates. There is an obvious discrepancy between the actual debate discourse and the parliamentary discourse defined by the code of behaviour.

1.   Analysis of Relevant Social Practices

In May 1995, the ruling Democrat Party was under public scrutiny concerning an alleged abuse of power. The Democrat-run Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operative was accused of conspiring in corruption and wrong-doings over a programme of land reform. The programme was known as *so po ko 4-01*. *So po ko* was the abbreviation of The Office of Land Reform for Agricultural Purposes. *So po ko 4-01* was the land reform project. The purpose of this project was to give out land categorised as 'deteriorated forest' to 'poor and needy' agriculturists. Some of the irregularities which occurred in the *so po ko* 4-01 project were in the area of Phuket province, a province that has the seventh highest income per capita in the country[3] (Udomsak, 1996: 102).

The scandal was brought out in public when one Thai newspaper, *Matichon*, raised the alarm that among the beneficiaries announced to *so po ko 4-01* land, more than ten belonged to wealthy business-based families. With the *so po ko* bill, these people were entitled to a huge piece of land in Phuket, a relatively prosperous and popular tourist city in the South of Thailand. To add insult to injury, some of these people had close ties to leading Democrat MPs; for example, one of them was brother of Mr. Suthep Theuaksuban, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Co-operative and another was husband of Phuket MP, Ms. Anchali Vanich Thepabutr.

When the issue had been disclosed some months before this no-confidence debate took place,[4] the Democrat party tried to appease the public outcry and restore the 'honest' image of the party through the resignation of both the Minister and Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Niphon Phromphan and Suthep Theuaksuban. This was supposed to project the image of Democrat members as 'honourable and responsible' for the scandal in which they 'were not involved'. Unfortunately, the resignations proved not only fruitless but they were also interpreted as the act of a coward who did not dare to face public investigation.

However, it was a speech by Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, leader of the Democrat party that could be considered the last straw for the Opposition and the public. Chuan's rhetoric compared the beneficiaries of the *so po ko* scheme with students who obtain government scholarships. By comparing the poverty-based qualification of *so po ko* beneficiaries with the academic performance-based qualification of government scholars, the Prime Minister had made a catastrophic error of judgement. All his speech achieved was to compromise him further. It led many people to believe that he was acting in support of his fellow party members; that he was trying to find an excuse to cover up the alleged corruption. He was considered self-serving; he cared about the benefit of his party enough to compromise his moral sense. His action caused him to fall out of public admiration as an impeccable and honest politician, an outstanding quality people had highly cherished in him and his party.

When this no-confidence debate took place months after the scandal had broken out, the target of the debate was not only those MPs who were related to the *so po ko* beneficiaries but also the Prime Minister and the entire cabinet for their conspiracy of silence. The coalition at the time of the debate consisted of four parties; the Democrats (DP), Chart Pattana (CPP), Palang Dharma (PDP) and Seritham (SP).

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[3] Thailand has 76 provinces in all.
[4] There had been a movement for no-confidence debate in 1994 concerning this issue. At that time, the debate would be for the purpose of passing a vote of no-confidence in the Minister and Deputy Minister of Agriculture. However, the debate was cancelled following the realignment of the coalition.

The aim of the debate, apart from launching allegations against the Democrat party, was to pressure the CPP and PDP to isolate the Democrats in the hope that the coalition would collapse. By splitting the coalition, the Opposition would give themselves a chance to take their turn as a government. This debate succeeded in splitting the coalition. Being aware that he might lose the vote, Chuan decided to dissolve the parliament before it was passed.

The dissolution of the parliament in May 1995 was followed by a general election. In July 1995, Banharn Silpa-archa led his Chart Thai Party (CTP) to become the core of a five-party coalition. The coalition consisted of the Chart Thai (CTP), New Aspiration (NAP), Social Action (SAP), Prachakorn Thai (PTP) and Muanchon (MP).

Banharn, a provincial businessman-cum-politician, became the prime minister despite the scepticism of the urban middle class. His coalition exemplified the political approach of provincial businessmen which was found less than satisfying by the Thai elite and the pro-Democrat middle class. This group of urban people was cynical of Banharn's administrative abilities and doubtful about his honesty. Soon after Banharn formed his cabinet, there were allegations in the press concerning irregularities in contracts for business associations, political manipulation of state enterprise boards and bidding committees (King, 1997: 160). The cabinet was accused of being under-qualified to administer the country. Moreover its members were accused of corruption and benefit sharing among their cronies. Ten of Banharn's cabinet ministers had first gone under allegations in a no-confidence debate in May 1996 (Supawadi, Duangjit and Nathaporn, 1998). The government won the vote and there was an overhaul of the cabinet. Unfortunately, the government's attempt to restore its image and build public credibility did not succeed. The relentless public unrest coupled with people's mounting scepticism further inflamed the issue and culminated in a no-confidence debate held in mid-September 1996.

This no-confidence debate focused on the prime minister. The opposition, led by the sharp-tongued former prime minister Chuan Leekpai, gained overwhelming support from the people of Bangkok and the Thai elite. The Democrats, who were renowned for their rhetorical ability, formed the core speakers of the debate. Being aware of their strong public support, the opposition launched allegations, some of them concerned the prime minister and his cabinet's administration but many others concerned the prime minister's personal life, for example, questions about his father's Thai nationality, alleged falsification of his birth date, alleged plagiarism of his law thesis (King, 1997: 161) and his daughter's alleged tax evasion. All the issues seemed to suggest that Mr. Banharn and his family lacked integrity. The emphasis of this debate on personal issues is not common in Thai no–confidence debates. These personal allegations launched in such an overt manner were a distinctive characteristic of this debate. Taking into account the fact that the Democrats had just lost badly and shamefully in a no-confidence debate led by the CTP a year earlier over the issue of *so po ko 4-01,* it was possible to think that the Democrats were, in fact, on a revenge mission.

2.   Analysis of Discourse

The discourse of no-confidence debates has to challenge the code of behaviour. It has to be practised in the face of two conflicting forces: the need to cause the government maximum damage and to do so seemingly within the frame of the code of behaviour, in other words, how best to flout the rules. Therefore, the no-

confidence debate discourse which may be considered most effective and most powerful here is that which, in breaching the code, causes most damage yet goes unchallenged by the Speaker of the House, the code keeper. MPs are obliged to challenge the parliamentary code of behaviour because they are aware that the ordinary people outside do not appreciate the dry formal debate it produces. In order to maintain their audience's attention, MPs need to draw upon some discourse strategies to make a potentially monotonous and formal debate interesting. By departing from the formalities, an MP's discourse can be found more approachable. When the public feel that MPs are not talking over their head, they are more likely to listen. Moreover, if an MP embeds a 'hook' in his/her speech, it can be more interesting. Once MPs manage to hold the public attention, they have created for themselves a chance to persuade people to believe in what they say.

In looking at no-confidence debate discourse, there is evidence of breaches of the code of behaviour using various strategies. Some breaches go unchallenged, while other are interrupted by either the Speaker or other members of the House. The effectiveness of these breaches depends partly on the strategies employed and personal styles of speaking. The breaches and the formulae of strategies employed reflect the ability and wit of each member in getting around established regulations. These breaches regularly occur and are known as part of the 'parliamentary game' (*Arthit*, June 21-27, 1996). This game can be particularly obvious during no-confidence debates when the adversarial atmosphere is intense and emotions are running high.

The parliamentary game generally involves the manipulation of regulations which often leads to the manipulation of language. The manipulation of language can take place at the level of semantics. Words are used: some of them in their own dictionary sense, while some of them have their meanings abused to suit the rhetoric of the speaker. No-confidence debates are so notorious for their inventive alteration of word's meaning that some magazines or newspapers publish columns before the debate featuring the vocabulary used in debates with its traditional meaning and the meaning assigned to it by politicians (*Arthit*, May 12-18 1995: 11). Moreover, there is also a manipulation of language at the level of pragmatics, that is, how the speaker produces an utterance which can acquire the desired meaning and significance in society. In this case it is how the speaker designs an utterance which, by its content is violating the code of behaviour, yet in a way that enables it to go unchallenged. The discourse can be of more than one genre. It is then hard for anyone to actually judge whether it is casual and therefore violates regulations or not. Moreover, MPs can use other people's voices to make some provocative remarks. Denial of agency makes it complicated to rule out the remark because the speaker does not technically say it him/herself. The changing of genre and the mixture of the speaker's own words and other people's words represent the two levels of intertextuality defined by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999).

In order to do intertextual analysis, first we have to analyse the genres and voices displayed in the debate. The genre that is likely to appear first is formal parliamentary discourse. According to Amara, formal genre in Thai language means 'language which is perfectly complete at every level, for example, correctly pronounced and complete in terms of sentence structure' (Amara, 1999: 73). Formal genre is signified by the use of more complex grammatical constructions- more related to written than spoken language- the lexical choices are from a more formal register and more attention is given to pronunciation; it is closer to standard pronunciation. The first part of parliamentary debate can be categorised as formal language according

to this definition. It is determined by the parliamentary code of behaviour that the debate should begin with a self-introduction by the speaker. The speaker has to state his/her full name, the constituency he/she represents and the party with which he/she is affiliated. Since this part of the debate is relatively fixed in terms of content as well as style, I would call it a 'ritual beginning'. The ritual beginning also features discourse that develops good understanding between speaker and audience and generally legitimises his/her action. This phase of speech can be the only one where the discourse is entirely formal. The formality is shown, for example, in the pronoun '*kraphom*'. For many male speakers, it would be the only place where we would find the first person pronoun used in full, elsewhere the shortened form *phom* is used. The full form of the word helps to signify a formal register of parliamentary genre. There are also some MPs who opt to use *kraphom* throughout, such as former prime minister Chuan Leekpai. However, the formality in the ritual beginning appears to be compulsory: even the most casual speaker has to adhere to formality at this phase. Since every speech has to begin with a ritual beginning, it can be said that the first genre every speech displays is a formal parliamentary one.

According to our study of no-confidence debates, after the ritual beginning, the speaker will move through phases of preface to the allegations, the allegations themselves and conclusion, respectively. These three phases do not have a fixed pattern both in terms of context and style compared to the first phase. This is when the speaker is free to present his/her own style in making a speech. As these phases are not as closely regulated as the ritual beginning, this is where the debate tends to display intertextuality at both levels.

Level 1: The combination in discourse of different genres or different discourses:

The intertextuality at this level is the changing articulation of genres. The intertextuality can be shown within one clause or in different stages of discourse. The intertextuality within a single clause is termed *mixed intertextuality* while intertextuality at different stages of discourse is termed *sequential intertextuality*. The appearance of one genre within another is termed *embedded intertextuality*. No-confidence debates display all three categories of intertextuality. The following is an example of a multi-generic sentence; more than one genre appears in a single sentence.

(1)   Now, <u>one day out of the blue </u>the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and his secretary <u>jumped in and claimed </u>that [they] had received a plea from brothers and sisters, Phuket residents that there must be a land reform project operated in the province
[*Trong ni yu ma wan di kheun di than ratthamontri chuai wa kan krasuang kaset lae lekha khong than koe thuk thak dai rap kham rong rien jak prachachon khon Phuket wa ja tong tham kan patirup thi din jangwat Phuket*]
(Chalerm, line 61- 62).

The sentence in this example can be divided into two clauses: main clause, 'Now, <u>one day out of the blue</u> [*yu ma wan di khuen di*], the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and his secretary <u>jumped in and claimed</u> [*thuk thak*]' and subordinate clause, 'that they had received a plea from Phuket residents that there should be a land reform project in the province'. The phrases used in the first clause have a casual register. 'One day out of the blue' or '*yu ma wan di khuen di*' in Thai by itself

represents both levels of intertextuality. The meaning is not self-contained; it cannot be interpreted at its surface meaning. Even though *yu ma wan di khuen di* literally means 'until the good day good night', its meaning is close to the English idiom, *one day out of the blue*. These two phrases show that something suddenly occurs unexpectedly. Second, this idiom signifies casual register. By itself, it signals casual reasoning (or the lack of it) that something just happens without apparent reasons. *Thuk thak* or 'jumped in and claimed', even though it is not an idiom, the phrase also belongs to the casual conversation genre. Again, it implies that someone makes a claim without any substantial grounds. Therefore it can be said that the main clause of this sentence has a casual register shown in the use of idiom *yu ma wan di khuen di* and the word *thuk thak.* The subordinate clause of this sentence, however, appears to be formal because the words used there are uttered in proper form or in full: plea [*kham riek rong*], brothers and sisters, Phuket residents [*phi nong prachachon khon Phuket*] and the operation of land reform project [*tham kan patirup thidin*]. The words are official ones such as 'plea' and 'residents' signifying that the discourse conforms to parliamentary discourse.

The second example also shows sequential intertextuality signalled by its lexical choice. *Da lap lang* or 'to run someone down behind his/her back' is a casual phrase. The word *da* itself is part of a casual-offensive register. In Thai, there are many words which mean to speak negatively of someone. *Da* is the most casual of all, as well as the most offensive.

(2)   Mr. Speaker, that's the good part. I was in that government. I am not a person who walked out of Chatichai's government and <u>ran him down behind his back</u> [*da lap lang*]. For whatever good things he did, he deserved praise (Chalerm, line 85- 86).

In the following example, two genres are again articulated within the same sentence. First the sentence contains a formal parliamentary genre presented by the phrase 'Your Honours' [*than thang lai*]. This phrase is normally used as a formal address to the other MPs in the House. However, after this phrase with formal register, the sentence turns to articulate casual genre by saying *fang laeo kit oao.* Even though I have provided the closest translation of this phrase, the attempt to convey its casual register is bound to fail. The word '*oao*' added after a verb is a conversational particle. It makes the sentence sound more casual. Also it articulates the interpersonal relationship between S and H, as if S directly urges H to engage in that action. So the conversational particle '*oao*' signals the casual conversational genre in the later part of the sentence.

(3)   All Your Honours have heard it now you work it out for yourselves [*than thang lai fang laeo kit <u>oao</u>*] (Chalerm, line 190).

Casual style does not show only in lexical choices or idioms, it can also be shown in the manner the debate is presented. Formal speech is expected to be a monologue. It is not supposed to overtly address anyone. According to the code of behaviour, if a parliamentary speech has to address anybody at all, it must be the House Speaker. However, not all speeches are monologues. Many of them lean towards a dialogic form, either by overtly addressing another party or using some conversational particles. These particles in Thai do not have any meaning on their

own. They are added only to show casual intimacy between S and H. By doing so, these particles can be categorised as a casual conversational register.

The next example also shows mixed intertextuality within one sentence. It is worth noting that a sentence in Thai can be more extended than English because Thai does not have rigid sentence structure as English. As a result, it is relatively easy to find multi-generic forms in Thai. The following multi-generic coordination sentence has casual register in one clause and formal parliamentary in another. As a result, the coordination sentence has mixed intertextuality.

(4)   People who have a background in law know that it cannot be interpreted otherwise unless they want to <u>distort the meaning</u>, to <u>pretend</u> that they do not know, to protect their own clique, to use their character in being rhetorical to attract people's attention.
[*nak got mai ti an got mai ru du got mai pen plae pen yang eun mai dai loei khrap wen tae ja tabaeng ja klaeng mai ru ja khao khang puak ton eng oao karaktoe phut phroe sanoe hu riek rong kwam son jai rong hai lot waen*] (Chalerm, line 349-352).

The clause beginning with 'unless' appears to feature casual lexical choices such as *tabaeng,* which means 'to distort the meaning'. However, the clause preceding this has features of formal parliamentary discourse: the formality reflects in its lexical choice and its clause organisation.

(5)   They said metaphorically, it's like giving out the whole pig and telling them to butcher it [*kha cham lae*] and say if there was any sirloin [*laeo ta gon bok <u>wai duai</u> tha joe mu nueua daeng <u>la goe</u> trong nueua kan wai hai duai <u>na</u>*]. If there was, [as if I] told them to keep it for me. Give the whole pig out and told them to keep any part but shout out if they find any sirloin and put aside. Is there anybody who if they had been given this would not carve out the whole loin part? One pig has only 10 kg. The person who is naïve enough not to carve out the loin is silly having been given the whole pig [*khrai chuen laeo mai chuen hai tit nueua daeng wai <u>la goe</u> mun goe ngoe <u>si khrap</u>*] (Samak, line 174-180).

The underlined words in the above example are conversational particles which tell us that Samak is speaking in a casual way here. The particles signal that Samak is conducting a dialogue with himself as S and audience as hearer (henceforth H). Moreover, this example is casual not only by the use of conversational particles but also with the use of metaphor as well. Here Mr. Samak compares the action of Ministry of Agriculture in giving out the whole forest and expecting the beneficiaries to return the non-deteriorated area to giving out the whole pig expecting the receiver to give back the sirloin. To compare a governmental land reform policy with a less complicated and more familiar case of 'sirloin' pork, he makes the policy sound more understandable and more tangible for ordinary people. By comparing good forest to loin, it is easier for the audience to perceive the absurdity of the policy that expects this good part to be returned. The metaphorical explanation can be seen as an understandable way to explain the policy to people as well as to describe how absurd the government's policy was.

The use of figures of speech in many cases can constitute a casual register. The casual register normally derives from the use of 'casual' metaphor or simile. By casual

I mean the attempt to compare governmental matters with something more familiar by using casual lexical choices. This casual figurative explanation strengthens the interpersonal relationship between S and H. Moreover, it makes S's point easier to understand. The following example shows mixed intertextuality within one sentence. The first part of this sentence talks about the body of law which in the latter part is compared to a mantra. By comparing law to a rather familiar thing like a mantra[5], S shows that he does not think it is legitimate for the government to refer to this clause of law in this situation. The stark contrast between the law and a superstitious mantra creates intertextuality because law belongs to a formal and rational realm whereas mantra belongs to an inexplicable one. The comparison of two different, almost opposite things sounds absurd. The intertextuality here is used to emphasise the absurdity of the government's judgement.

(6)   According to Section 30 article 5 that you people like to use <u>as a defensive mantra</u> [*tam matra samsip wak ha ni thi than thang lai chop ang pen khatha pong kan tua*] (Chalerm, line 326)

Some figures of speech come in a form of word play. The combination of words which rhyme creates a poetic effect. The use of excessive and sometimes irrelevant phrases primarily for poetic effect is characteristic of a casual conversational register. This sort of word play can feature antonyms such as:

(7)   Until the second stage forest has been given to *so po ko*. You can't tell right from wrong. You just give it out with your ears and your eyes shut. [*jon krathang mop pa khan thi song hai so po ko pai phit thuk chua di thi hang mai ru lap hu lap ta hai*] (Chalerm, line 745- 746)

Here Chalerm starts with two sentences which are relatively formal. Then he moves on to explain how ignorant the government was using the metaphor, 'to give out with your ears and your eyes shut'. However, the original metaphor in Thai is *phit thuk chua di thi hang mai ru lap hu lap ta hai*. In order to say that the government could not tell right from wrong, he uses three pairs of antonyms to elaborate this point: right-wrong [*phit- thuk*], good-bad [*chua- di*][6] and fine-broad [*thi- hang*]. It is apparent that the last pair could be the odd one here because it does not seem to suggest any particular value neither does it relate to the issue discussed. The last pair were probably be added for some rhythmic effect. Then he metaphorically comments that the government ignored any information about land reform by saying that the government gave out land with their ears and eyes shut, *lap hu lap ta hai.*

This sort of metaphor in a form of word play is particularly apparent in Samak's speech. Samak has a tendency to use indirect language in the form of a figure of speech rather than more straightforward constructions. He uses metaphor comparing political situation with a simple thing which has a similar trait to make the political situation more understandable for people. Sometimes the metaphor used was mainly to accentuate the point he liked to make. Therefore it could sound fairly remote from the situation with which it was supposed to be compared to.

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[5] In Thai discourse reference to mantra is a fairly familiar lexical item.

[6] Thai ordering of the pairs is a reverse of English translation. In Thai we talk about wrong-right [*phit-thuk*] and bad-good [*chua-di*]. However, For English translation, I follow English pair for the sake of clarity.

(8)   When we cook *yam* (Thai spicy salad), whichever salad it may be, *yam lek yam yai* once it's cooked, we have to place it on the table and eat immediately. But here we have left it (to stand) for five months. We should have discussed it on the 14 of December. Now it's 17th of May (Samak, line 4-6).

In this example, Samak compared the scandal to *yam* [Thai spicy salad]. The two things are very different. The only similarity which is accentuated here is that the two things should not be left to stand. They should be dealt with immediately. Samak also played with words with a slightly changing a well-known catch phrase, such as *bo daeng* in the following example to *bo dam,* and therefore produced another catch phrase which was a total contrast to the original one. The incongruity between the original phrase and the new ones could be potentially humorous.

(9)   …and apologise immediately (saying) that it has never dawned on me that the project which had been promoted as a *bo daeng* [red bow] project for the last two years could turn out to be a *bo dam* [black bow] in the end (Samak, line 11-12).

In Thai *bo daeng* is a phrase which means an outstanding piece of work. By slightly changing *bo daeng* to *bo dam,* red bow to black bow, Samak has invented a brand new phrase which has the opposite meaning from the original one[7]. It has instantly become popular. This phrase aptly put by Samak was repeated in newspapers and in people's conversation.

The informal-casual register is also reflected in the existence of words which seem to be out of place in parliamentary discourse because of their strong meaning and provocative nature. This appearance of words from one genre in another genre is called *embedded intertextuality.*

(10)   Khun[8] Suthep is <u>dead</u> [*tai pai laeo*] in terms of his political career. The man has died. Why should I kill him once again? It would be like shooting a <u>corpse</u> [*sop*] (Chalerm, line 336-338).

The words 'dead' [*tai*] and 'corpse' [*sop*] have too strong a meaning and too negative a connotation to be used to describe MPs in parliamentary discourse. However, these strong words can be employed as a 'hook', a catch phrase to attract people's attention. Some groups of people find the use of sensational words more interesting than others, for example, ordinary people with lower educational background may prefer these kind of words because they expect no-confidence debates to be some sort of a verbal confrontation, to steer away from moderation. Moreover, a speech that shows the changing articulation of genres provides an element of unexpectedness in the speech. The fact that we do not know what will be said next, and how S will phrase it, keeps people listening. Sometimes the abrupt change of genre also creates incongruity. As a result, it is potentially humorous. An occasional aggressiveness and humour is what keeps the audience listening.

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[7] Red bow is used like 'goldstar' in English while black bow is used like 'black mark'.
[8] *Khun* is a title in Thai indicating respect towards the person addressed.

Intertextuality at this level adds sensationalism to the supposedly monotonous parliamentary debate. The changing articulation of genres adds an element of unexpectedness to the discourse. The sudden change of genre within the same sentence and the use of words which do not belong to parliamentary discourse create incongruity between the expected discourse and the one which is actually uttered. The incongruity can be found revolting, such as in the case of the words dead [*tai*] and corpse [*sop*], or as witty humour as in the case of 'red bow-black bow' [*bo daeng bo dam*]. It can also be found as sarcasm as in the case of *tabaeng*, 'to pervert its course', 'to pretend that they do not know' [*tabaeng ja klaeng mai ru…*] In any case, the changing articulation of genres succeeds in creating elements that are more rarely found in conventional parliamentary discourse: unexpectedness, wittiness, humour and sarcasm. These elements could not be achieved had the discourse been designed otherwise.

Level 2: The combination in S's discourse of the specific words of others mixed with S's words in a form of reported speech:

Intertextuality at this level also frequently appears in the no-confidence debate. It appears that reported speech is used in the debate of almost every MP. According to the analysis, intertextuality at this level is deployed for various purposes:

1. To make negative comments
    Reported speech is the 'words of others' which appear in our discourse. One of the purposes of using other people's words is to detach S from the point he/she is making. This detachment strategy is employed mostly when the point made is a negative one. Much reported speech is used to make negative comments. By borrowing other people's voices, S can attack the government while keeping his/her hands relatively clean. Reported speech gives S an exit that it was, in fact, not him/her who said this, should the government or people under attack take offence from the point made.

(11)   Excuse me for using this term. It really is a jargon widely used among economists, not just me. They called this kind of policy, 'dog[9] biting its own tail'. [*laeo khue nak sethasat khao put kan mai chai phom put khao riek wa nayobai ma gut hang tua eng*] (Trairong, line 305)

Here in 1996, Trairong compared Banharn-led government's financial policy to 'a dog biting its own tail'. It is fairly extreme to compare the government policy to the act of an animal regarded as lowly by Thais such as a dog. Not only that, the government's policy is compared to a dog behaving rather foolishly by 'biting its own tail'. However, Trairong manages to get his figurative comment across uninterrupted, no matter how insulting it may sound. Even if he was interrupted, he could always point out that it was not him who said this but it was the words of 'economists'. By safely getting his comparison across, he has given himself a starting point to attack the government further on the following:

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[9] Dog is an animal which represents two very different characteristics in Thai perspective. It can be seen as a loyal pet or as a scummy animal.

(12) And that the BOT injected money into the system which they first sucked out but they had sucked more than they should and so they are sitting there injecting it back in. What they are doing is sitting there biting their tail [*thi tham yu ni nang gut hang tua eng*] (Trairong, line 312- 314)

Trairong explains the government's handling of financial issues before concluding that what the government is doing now is 'biting its own tail' issuing such policy. It appears that Trairong has moved one step further from the 'economists'' comment while still using the same comparison. While the economists commented on government policy, Trairong now uses his own voice to comment on Banharn's government itself that it is now biting its tail [*thi tham yu ni nang gut hang tua eng*]. His comment can be taken as a direct insult. However, since he uses the same metaphor as the economists, he runs less risk of being seen as the one to be blamed.

In the following example from 1995, Chalerm is criticising the then Minister of Agriculture Suthep Thuaksuban, Democrat MP's land reform project in Suratthani, his constituency. He points out that the way Suthep suddenly took away land from people to include it in the *so po ko* project is a clear act of malpractice. It is also a daring and defiant one. He figuratively describes its defiant nature using a Chinese proverb. However, he said that it was not him who said this. This is how a Chinese movie 'would' describe this situation.

(13) I'd say it can be compared to what a character in a Chinese movie might say, describing someone as <u>wearing a red shirt, having a bell hanging round his neck and pick pocketing in broad day light</u> [*nang jin khao wa wing rao klang wan sai sua daeng khwaen krading*] (Chalerm, line 102- 103).

By detaching himself from the comment which apparently compares Mr. Suthep's act to a crime like pick-pocketing, he can hardly be held responsible for such a provocative comparison.

2. Postulated Accusation

In the debate, S does not simply want to launch a one-sided attack on the government, he/she sometimes needs to retaliate against what the government allegedly said. S has to start by saying that something has been said. He/she sometimes uses unspecified agency such as 'others' or uses the passive voice to omit agency altogether because it can be too confrontational to put it any other way. Moreover, it can also be risky since many of these comments were made off- record. To specify who made a comment would mean putting him/herself in a vulnerable position. However, as the context of a no-confidence debate is rather specific in pointing out who is the target, unspecified 'others' can appear to refer to the government. By stating what 'the government' said earlier, he/she can argue with it now.

(14) I am doing my duty for an opposition MP who has always been insulted and sneered at by the government that we would not be able to obtain any information for our debate. <u>The opposition is bad and has its own festering wounds all over</u>, they said. Mr. Speaker, if a guy like me <u>had wounds on my back, I would most certainly have had iodine poured down on my wounds long</u>

ago. No [*puak fai khan man phlae woewa khon yang phom tha lang pen phlae thuk thing joe rat pai nan laeo*] (Chalerm, line 822-824).

In this example, Chalerm opts for confrontation. He has made it quite clear that it was a member of the government who said that the opposition 'is bad and have festering wounds all over'. Saying that someone has festering wounds [*phlae woewa*] all over, sends out a feeling of disgust and contempt as well as a connotation of pathetic inferiority. Chalerm then retaliates not by rejecting the remark but speculating what must have happened to him if he did have wounds all over. Since it is apparent that what he speculates has not taken place, it means that the government's comment must have been false. This example shows how the use of reported speech helps bring what was said in the past back to the present. By so doing, S has given himself a chance to retaliate. In this case, Chalerm is also deflating a rather flowery metaphor, buy extending its usage, and bringing it back to reality. It can be considered sarcastic in some respects.

Postulated accusation can also be used to create sarcastic effect.

(15)   I'd like to ask whether during the period between 1973 to 1992, 18 years in [poor and needy] people had received only 3.3 millions square rai of land? It [3.3 millions square rai] was considered too little. It was considered not the way to do it or that there was still so much Thai soil left (Samak, line 34- 37).

Here Samak implies that it was the government who thought that land reform in Thailand covered too small an area. Then he implies that the government wants to distribute all the remaining forest land to people under the banner of *so po ko*. This implicated accusation appears as sarcasm because it contradicts our basic judgement that no government is foolish enough to proclaim that they will distribute every last piece of land to the people.

3. Narrative Tools
Providing evidence of an allegation sometimes involves story-telling, especially when the evidence is extensive and circumstantial. In the following example, Trairong uses reported speech to narrate how the economic downturn caused by Banharn's government has affected real estate business.

(16)   When *man* builds a property development project, *man* would hire a contractor saying that *mung* would build *ku* a hundred houses. [He] talks like this because every time they do the project, they can sell all the houses. People would pay the down payment and pay a monthly mortgage for it. Money would keep coming in. *Man* would sign a contract with a contractor saying that *ku* would pay 6 months in advance for the amount of 10 millions for the building cost. But when interest rates increase like this, when we have financial policy like this, financial policy was not meant to *ai nan*[10] (that). [So] *ai nan* (that property developer) would be as extravagant as usual but money was so tight. The interest rates shot to 16- 17%; which monkey would take mortgage for a house? (Trairong, line 173-180)

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[10] *Ai nan* is a third person pronoun which can be used to refer to either object or person. It has informal register. Its meaning and register are similar to *man*, which is also a third person pronoun.

In this example, Trairong uses *ku* as first person pronouns, *mung* as second person pronoun and *man* as third person pronouns. *Ku, mung* and *man* are pronouns which can be categorised as very casual ones[11]. The reason why he used *man* and *ku* to refer to the property developer and *mung* for the contractor instead of more formal counterparts could be that he wanted his story to be told in a way it would have been told among acquaintances; to be narrated in reported speech. Moreover, his narrative is also casual in terms of his lexical choices. He opts for the language at a level similar to the one this group of people in construction business is most likely to use. *Man, ku* and *mung* are words normally used among people within the construction business and other labour- oriented fields where most of the personnel are men. The way he tells the story using these words sounds more realistic and more convincing. The word 'monkey' used at the end of the quotation casually implies that not even a monkey, not to mention a person, would mortgage a house while the interest rates were as high as this. The use of the word 'monkey' to explain that no one in his/her right mind would do something is a feature of spoken language. Thus the entire quotation told in casual language was rather incongruous with the fact that it was uttered in a parliamentary debate which was supposed to be rather more formal. However, a story told in this manner is more likely to hold audience attention. It gives detail in a conversational manner. It keeps the audience interested even though the role-play between property developer and contractor is only remotely relevant to the government's economic mismanagement under discussion. This excerpt is an example of intertextuality at both levels: changing articulation of genres and the use of reported speech.

7. Discussion

This paper is an attempt to analyse how intertextuality works in Thai no-confidence debates. According to the analysis of discourse, it is apparent that there is intertextuality at both levels in all the three speeches. The intertextuality at level 1, the changing articulation of genre, can be seen as a part of the in-built structure of no-confidence debates. It is a direct product of the two competing conjunctures of the debate: its multiple audiences and its code of behaviour. While formal parliamentary discourse is theoretically a compulsory style of the debate, the departure from such formality is pragmatically an obligation. Being aware that there is difference between the style of debate expected by its audience and the one regulated by the code of behaviour, S has to produce a form of discourse which is a compromise between the entirely different expectations.

The formality in the ritual beginning appears to conform to the parliamentary code of behaviour. Its formal speech featuring formal lexical choice uttered in full form as well as the grammatically complete sentence structure is considered as being of the parliamentary genre. This ritual beginning conforms to the expectation of the parliamentary code of behaviour. However, to produce the entire speech in this fashion means excluding much of the potential audience outside the parliament who expect no-confidence debates to be more witty and entertaining. As a result, S is obliged to depart from formality if he/she wants to take the public on board. Throughout no-confidence debates, there are constant changes in articulations of

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[11] Thai has complex deference system which reflects in the variety of words used for 'I' and 'you'. Of all the seven pairs of words used between equals for I-you, *ku-mung* is the most informal one.

genre, mostly between a formal parliamentary genre and a casual conversational and a casual narrative one. This changing of genre is shown by lexical choices, use of figurative language, conversational particles and sentence structure. The constant shift of genres displays how S struggles to produce the most effective discourse within the constraints of the two competing conjunctures.

Intertextuality at level 2, reported speech, is employed to show denial of agency and as narrative tool. According to the analysis, the first two purposes of employing reported speech are to make negative comments and to imply accusation. These can also be risky things to say. In fact negative comments are not very different from accusations. They both mean verbal attack. By commenting or accusing someone, S runs the risk of being too informal and being seen as aggressive and offensive. In addition, in launching an implied accusation, S risks losing his/her credentials should the accusation be overturned. S may well be held responsible for whatever he/she said since, as previously stated, parliamentary privilege does not extend to broadcast debates like no-confidence debates. To avoid these risks, it is preferable for S to distance him/herself from the point he/she has to make. By borrowing another person's voice to make the point, S can achieve two goals at the same time: he/she can attack the government without having to bear responsibility for the act. However, it is worth noting that some MPs such as Chalerm seek to enhance their popularity as a down to earth politician by making comments which border on aggressive and offensive speech. Being aggressive and offensive can also be found as an attractive trait by a certain groups in the electorate.

Not only is reported speech used as a linguistic strategy to make comments and accusations, it is also used as a narrative tool to make a story more interesting. Reported speech allows S to tell a story in any level of language. It allows S to depict the story in a language actually used in that context. From the analysis, Trairong describes the grievances of the real estate sector in a casual conversational genre. The informal genre is reflected in his use of very casual pronouns. The story told in reported speech is a vivid way to make the grievances of property developers more understandable and more interesting for ordinary people.

The above discussion seems to suggest that there is a proliferation of intertextuality in the no-confidence debate and that it is there for a purpose. Intertextuality allows no-confidence debate discourse to operate effectively in the face of its three conjunctures. The changing articulation of genre makes it possible to attack the government with less risk of being caught in breaching the parliamentary code of behaviour. By being able to attack the government, the opposition maximises its chance in being able to bring down the government, generally by way of winning public support. The denial of agency created by reported speech provides S a safety exit while attacking the government. The two levels of intertextuality can be seen as linguistic strategies because they serve these social and political purposes.

In the light of this study we can tentatively suggest that intertextuality has an active dialectical relationship with the society. Not only does the history of discourse manifest itself in intertextuality, intertextuality also serves as a strategy to create the most effective discourse in that particular context. It can be a suitable strategy for a discourse which operates in the face of two or more competing conjunctures. Intertextuality allows S to attend to the limitation of the conjunctures within one discourse, thus create a compromising discourse which can overcome the given constraints.

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